True v Utah Department of Transportation

True appealed summary judgment to Department in their negligence claim. The panel, with one judge concurring in result, affirmed. The majority held that True failed to raise the issue of whether department proximately caused their injuries which became the governing standard the day after summary judgment was granted, thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate and review and did not even attempt to argue one of the exceptions to preservation applied. It held that True’s challenge to the ruling the permitting exception in the state tort claim act applied failed as they did not challenge the district court’s ruling that their injuries were caused by the issuance of a permit by Department and thus any analysis of actions or omissions at the scene of the collision here was unnecessary. Harris concurred in result arguing that issues are was must be preserved and here the issue of the permit exception was raised below, there is no difficulty in appellate courts dealing with a  change of law between a grant of summary judgment and entry of the judgment as changes in law during appeal are routinely applied, there are line drawing problems as to the time an affected party has to move for reconsideration or otherwise bring the argument before eth district co4rt and it is unclear what changes in the law qualify under the majority approach, and argued the permit and inspection exceptions applied as Department’s involvement here came about because it issued a permit and inspected the intersection involved here to enforce the terms of the permit and this involvement was foreseeable, the permitting process was sufficiently formal and True did not appeal the ruling that the inspection exception applied.

NPEC LLC et al. v Miller

Miller appealed the dismissal of his complaint. The panel affirmed holding the claims involved had been raised in an earlier appeal which was dismissed with prejudice and thus law of the case barred the new suit here.

State v Rinehart

Rinehart appealed the restitution order in her burglary case. The panel affirmed. It held that remand under Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B was unnecessary here as the allegations that Rinehart sold her own goods not victim’s goods was speculative given victim’s identification of items taken and sold and Rinehart’s being in the house the day before the building providing an alternate explanation, allegations of a witness supporting Rinehart’s claim she sold her own goods was speculative given the lack of identification of the witness and the district court took into account the ability of Rinehart to work in setting the restitution amount and was family with Rinehart due to her frequent appearances on various charges.