iDrive Logistics LLC v IntegraCore LLC

IntegraCore appealed partial summary judgment to iDrive in their breach of contract and bad faith claims and counterclaims. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held the district court did not relieve iDrive form the obligation to perform under the contract and correctly ruled that the plain language of the integrated contract entitled iDrive to payment for improvements in IntegraCore’s shipping costs whether or not the improvements were because of iDrive’s performance. It held the district court improperly granted partial summary judgment as to whether iDrive performed under the contract as there are disputed facts as to whether iDrive sent out required proposal requests to shippers, whether failure to have an officer go to IntegraCore’s office breached the contract and white any negotiations with shippers occurred. It held the district court erred in ruling there was no time frame for iDrive to perform as one obligation was to be done within two months of signature and a reasonable time to perform controls the other duties. It held the district court erred in ruling IntegraCore had to demand performance to prevent breach and failed to analyze whether the agreement was divisible as IntegraCore accepted iDrive’s audit work after alleged breach and may be barred from defending on nonperformance and also remanded the issues of materiality of breach and whether iDrive’s officer serving as IntegraCore’s logistics head owed fiduciary duties. It held the factual disputes precluded summary judgment on iDrive’s claims except as to IntegraCore’s breach of contract counterclaim as IntegraCore failed to challenge one of three independent basis for judgment.

Morgan and Summit Development & Lending Group, Inc. v Department of Commerce, Division of Securities

Morgan sought review of Department’s rejection of his statute of limitations defense. The panel affirmed holding none of the limitations periods identified by Morgana applied because the five year period under Utah Code 61-1-21.1 does not apply to administrative proceedings under the Court’s Phillips precedent, the four year period under 78B-2-307 does not apply to administrative proceedings under the Court’s Rogers precedent and the same reasoning that an administrative proceeding is not a civil action prevents the one year period in 78B-2-302(2) from applying.

In the interests of J.A. and C.A. (C.A. v State)

Father appealed the juvenile court order finding he neglected both children and severely abused one. The panel affirmed. It held there was no error in denying father’s motion for involuntary dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) because sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented to demonstrate father caused sever injuries to C.A. including the condition of C.A. when first responders arrived, evidence of an older and newer brain bleeds, eye bleeds, evidenced father and mother created stories to explain what doctors found  and the fact father was the only adult in the house when the injuries occurred. It held the child abuse act was not unconstitutionally vague as it gives notice that nonaccidental physical or developmental injury to child which is severe can lead to no reunification services and loss of parental rights and thus it is narrowly tailored to sever the compelling interest of protecting children and father admitted the injuries here were pretty severe so even if the act was somehow vague in abstract it was not vague as to father. It also held there is no requirement for criminal intent to be proven in the parental rights context and the requirement of nonaccidental injury requires the state to prove reckless, knowing or intentional conduct. It finally held that the juvenile court erred in relying on text messages which had not been admitted into evidence in making findings, but, the error did not requires reversal as the remaining circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove severe abuse and the text messages only went to whether father was frustrated and thus had limited relevance to the key issue of whether or not C.A. was injured accidentally.

Hall v Peterson

Peterson appealed the denial of his motion for directed verdict on hall’s claim of easement by estoppel. The panel reversed. It held Peterson preserved his arguments as he argued none of the elements were proven and the district court ruled on all his arguments. The panel noted easement by estoppel has never been recognized in Utah, that the parties used the restatement definition requiring permission to use, reasonable foreseeability of reliance by user and a substantial change of position by user and these elements are questions of fact which generally should go to the jury, but, the jury cannot find an easement based on speculation. It held the evidence presented did to prove estoppel because there is no evidence that the road in question was actually used by one predecessor in title (Diversified) or in any event used pervasively enough to give notice, that Peterson was even aware of any alleged use or that real estate agents frequently used the road and thus any reliance on Peterson’s silence was unreasonable and no evidence of actual reliance was admitted; that there was no evidence another owner actually purchased from Diversified; and that a third and fourth owners of the alleged dominant estate only used the road three or four times in forty years and didn’t even know Peterson owned the road. It reversed the award of costs to Hall as the underlying judgment was reversed. The case was remanded for further proceedings.