State v Bossert

Bossert appealed his convictions for child endangerment. The panel affirmed. It held that for purposes of knowing violation of 76-5-112.5 by permitting exposure to drugs, “permit” means having a measure of control or participation or active or knowing acquiescence. It reasoned that this definition is consistent with those used in other criminal contexts s found in the dictionary and effectuates legislative intent. Applying here, the panel held there was no error in denying Bossert’s motion for directed verdict as he gave his son marijuana, sold drugs in front of his son and kept drugs in an unlocked cabinet where his son could find them and this is sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury. It also held that there was no error in denying a motion to arrest judgment as there was no direct evidence of improper contact between a detective and the jury and the detective and bailiff both denied any improper contact.  

Crane-Jenkins v Milkarose, LLC

Milkarose appealed the denial of its Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to set aside a default order. The panel affirmed. It held the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the 197 day delay was unreasonable as Milkarose knew about the order a few days after it was entered and was not diligent in pursuing the Rule 60 motion. It also held the gross negligence ground for Rule 60 motions is limited to the death penalty context and in any event does not excuse late filing.

State v Serbeck

Serbeck appealed his convictions and consecutive sentences for sex with a minor. The panel affirmed. It held there was no ineffective assistance of counsel as the victim’s testimony that she believed Serbeck molested another child was done for the purpose of explaining why she came forward two years after the sex acts, was relevant to dispel the inference of fabrication and trial counsel adequately worked to dispel any inference Serbeck did molest another child by pointing out no charges were filed, vigorously cross examining the victim and getting a stipulation about the issue into the record. The panel affirmed consecutive sentences for two of the three convictions holding the district court based its decision on Serbeck’s blaming the victim and failing to take responsibility plus concern about reoffending not on information Serbeck argued was inaccurate.

Quast v Labor Commission

Quast appealed the Commission’s reversal of her award of disability benefits. The panel set aside the Commission ruling. It held that under precedent, Quast was only required to show limitations of her ability to basic work functions like lifting and bending and she did so here through evidence of limits due to her work related spine fusion

State v Christiansen

Christiansen appealed his sentence arguing the district court based his sentence in part on unreliable information. The panel affirmed holding the record demonstrated that the district court relied only on the crimes pled to and their impact on the victim not on the information alleged to be unreliable.

In the Interests of J.C. and H.A. (T.C. v State)

T.C. appeals the termination of her parental rights. The panel affirmed holding there was clear and convincing evidence T.C. failed to provide adequate housing namely she housed her children in places where methamphetamine and other drugs were present.

Williams v State

Williams appealed the dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition. The panel affirmed holding Williams failed to show any reason, let alone a reasonable justification, to excuse his 11 year delay in filing his petition.

Solid Q Holdings, LLC v Arenal Energy Corporation

Arenal appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The panel affirmed. It held there was contractual basis to order arbitration as Q did not sign any contract with Arenal with an arbitration clause. It held estoppel was not a basis either as Q did not seek any benefit under the contract between its owners and Arenal. It finally denied Q’s motion for attorney fees as Arenal’s appeal was not frivolous.

Biedermann, Burton and Chesley v Wasatch

Biedermann, Burton and Chesley sued County seeking declaratory judgment that a special service district was not properly established. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that under Utah Code 17D-1-213(b) only owners of property actually within the boundaries of the proposed district have standing, that merely being surrounded by the proposed district does mean property is in the boundaries. Thus, only Burton had standing because only she alleged ownership of property listed in the resolution creating the district.