United States v Carloss

Carloss appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The panel, 2-1 with an added concurrence, affirmed. The majority held that there is an implied license to go to a person’s front door and knock, that this license was not revoked by general no trespassing signs or by a sign prohibiting trespassing to hunt or fish as those activates are not done at the house and recent Supreme Court precedent did not change the outcome as the officers here did not go to the front door to conduct a search. It held the statements made by Carloss were admissible as they were given at eth side of the house during daylight hours and there was no show of authority y the officers. The concurrence argued that whether the license was revoked is determined by the objective reaction of a reasonable person in the totality of eth circumstances and merely putting up a no trespassing sing in a suburban neighborhood without fencing or other indicia that people are barred from approaching the front door is not enough. The dissent argued that the government has no right to conduct knock and talk encounters at homes and doorsteps without the owner’s permission and the governments assertion that it can even if a house is surrounded by a moat is inconsistent with the common law and the 4th Amendment as is the concurrence requirement of a fence plus a sign and here the four no trespassing signs sufficiently conveyed the revocation of any implied license. It also argued the majority approach will cause a new wave of litigation to flesh out when signs revoke license and when they do not.

 United States v Courtney

Courtney appealed the forfeiture order in his case and the refusal of the district court to charge nullification. The panel reversed on forfeiture and affirmed on nullification. It held the forfeiture issue was not waived because this is a criminal case and Courtney made augments on the issue albeit under the wrong standard and the panel exercised its discretion to address the issue. The panel found plain error in the order because there is an applicable statute, 18 USC 981(a)(2)(C), which governs restitution in cases like this involving fraud in obtaining credit, the district court was required to apply this statute and failed to do so and thus remand was necessary for recalculation under the correct standard. As to nullification, the panel noted the Supreme Court 10th Circuits have each rejected a defendant’s right to a nullification instruction.